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ABSTRACT
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often
purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms.  In this paper
we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon.  We model the electoral
competition between two candidates as a two-stage game.  In the first stage of
the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the
second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.  Our results
show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustained in
equilibrium.  The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variable for the
candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the same electoral
objectives end up "separating," that is, assuming different ideological positions.
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suggestions that have improved the paper considerably.
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1.  Introduction
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often
purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms.  Moreover, the
candidates' ambiguity typically involves precisely those issues which stand in the
center of public debate.  As Downs (1957) has observed, it is on the “ critical issues”
that candidates perceive incentives to equivocate, or to “ becloud their policies in a
fog of ambiguity.”  Downs argues that candidates have very good reasons to be
ambiguous: a candidate who advocates an ambiguous platform during the campaign
enjoys greater freedom in implementing his policies once he wins the election
without having to sacrifice his credibility.  Shepsle (1972) adds that “...we can accept
with Downs the assumption that politicians do not lie – that false information does
not enter the communications system – while still acknowledging the politician's
advantage in speaking “ half-truths” and in varying his appeals with variations in
audience and political climate.”
 From the candidates' perspective the level of ambiguity presented with their
platforms is the result of a conscious decision.  A candidate's decision regarding his
level of ambiguity can be interpreted as a choice of the candidate's level of
commitment to his ideology  A candidate who advocates an explicit and
unambiguous platform is actually committing himself to implement more specific
policies.  On the other hand, a candidate who presents an ambiguous platform is less
committed, avoiding promises which can be attributed to him later.  Since we accept
the assumption that candidates do not lie, it follows that the candidates' level of
ambiguity actually determines their level of commitment to their ideology.
If we assume that committing to an ideology is costly for a candidate, then we
will have that candidates would prefer ambiguous platforms to more specific ones.
They will not want to release information about their future policies to the voters in
order to have greater freedom of choice once in office.
A theory that supports this assumption is what Kreps (1979) names
"Preference for Flexibility."  This theory analyzes individual decisions that constrain
the choices that will be feasible in a later stage.  In an earlier stage the individual has
to choose the set of alternatives that will be available for his choice in the future.  If
the individual is unsure about his subsequent preferences, he will show in the early
stage a desire for flexibility, which translates into the following axiom: the union of3
two sets may be strictly preferred to each one taken separately1.  If candidates care
about their reputation, the choice of a platform during a campaign constrains their
choices of policies in case they win the election.  If they are unsure about what their
preferences on policies will be in case they win the election, candidates will have a
desire for flexibility that translates into a preference for ambiguity.
The analysis of the concept of freedom of choice made by Sen (1988) also
supports our assumption of preference for ambiguity.  Sen distinguishes between
the instrumental relevance of freedom (as the value for things as means to other
ends) and the intrinsic importance (their value as ends in their own right).  Thus,
the availability of a larger number of alternatives for the winner of the election
improves his well-being.
Another reason to prefer ambiguity may be the following:  a vague candidate
enjoys greater freedom in choosing his policy and can therefore "sell" his policy
plan to lobbyist groups, thereby increasing his post-election base of support and
possibly his party's budget (see Morton and Myerson (1992)).
On the other hand, voters, and especially risk averse ones, may prefer less
ambiguous candidates.  Less ambiguous candidates advocate more specific campaign
messages and therefore the uncertainty associated with their implemented policy is
smaller.  From the voters' perspective, the choice of the ambiguity level is positively
associated with the variance of the candidate's future policies.  Thus, risk averse
voters will prefer candidates to be unambiguous.
Thus, we have distinguished several conflicting forces that may affect
candidates' ambiguity levels.  Candidates would like to win elections with
ambiguous platforms, while voters prefer unambiguous candidates.  Since
candidates have to compete for the votes, they will face a trade-off.  The purpose of
this paper, then, is to understand the way in which these forces interact.  We present
a game theoretic model that allows us to determine the equilibrium levels of
candidates' ambiguity.  Maybe more interestingly, our approach enables us to
identify a way in which candidates' ambiguity levels and candidates' ideologies
interact with each other.
1 For example, if a decision maker prefers alternative a to alternative b, then the set  a { }  will be as
good as the set  a,b { }.  If, however, the decision maker is unsure about his future preferences, then the
set  a,b { } may be strictly preferred to the set  a { }.4
In our model candidates' platforms are represented by sets of policies.  Thus,
whereas in the standard spatial model candidates are constrained to choose a single
policy which they promise to implement once they win the election, in this paper
candidates have the option to remain somewhat vague regarding the policy that
they will implement in case they win the election, that is, to choose the size of the
set of policies.  The center of the candidate's "policy-set" is determined by the
candidate's choice of ideology and the size of the set is determined by the candidate's
level of ambiguity.  A more ambiguous candidate chooses a larger policy-set, and
therefore, in case he wins the election, he can choose to adopt a policy from a larger
number of them.  In other words, he is less constrained by his campaign promises,
thus he can implement more expedient policies as the need arises.  For example,
while an unambiguous leftist candidate has to implement a leftist policy if he wins
the election, an ambiguous leftist candidate might also implement a centrist policy if
it proves more expedient.
In contrast to the standard spatial voting model, our more general treatment
allows us to distinguish between candidates' policies and candidates' ideologies.
While there is an obvious relationship between the two, they need not coincide, and
indeed may belong to different spaces (see, Hinich and Munger (1992)).  While a
policy refers to a specific plan of action, an ideology refers to a broad and not
necessarily precise description of one's convictions and positions concerning
various issues that stand at the center of public debate.  The act of joining a party, for
instance, can serve as an example of ideological identification.  Another example is
the New-Hampshire primaries, in which a candidate already has to associate
himself with a certain ideology.  The mere fact that the candidate competes in the
primaries of the Democratic or the Republican party is sufficient to distinguish him
ideologically.  Furthermore, each candidate has to express some opinions to draw
voters' attention.  Still, at this stage of the campaign the candidates' positions on the
issues that are at stake may still be rather vague.  As the campaign unfolds, the
candidates have many opportunities to make themselves more explicit, say, in
interviews, debates, talk shows, and so forth.
We model the election process as a two stage game.  In the first stage, two
candidates simultaneously announce their ideological positions.  In the second stage
the candidates simultaneously decide how ambiguous they want to be.  Since in the
second stage of the game the ideologies of the candidates are publicly known, the5
candidates can choose their levels of ambiguity conditional on the ideology choices
(of both of them) in the first stage.  After the two candidates voiced their ideological
credo and chose their ambiguity levels or degree of commitment to their ideologies,
election takes place and the winning candidate is determined by majority rule.
Regarding candidates' preferences, we assume that candidates do not have
any a-priori preference for any ideological position.  Rather, they wish to win the
election while being as ambiguous as possible.  We assume that winning the
election results in some "utility" for a candidate which depends on his level of
ambiguity, while losing the election gives them a zero payoff.  We assume that
candidates do not know the exact distribution of voters' preferences, instead, they
share common beliefs over them.  We also make the standard assumption that the
candidates are expected utility maximizers; that is, they maximize the product of the
probability of winning the election and the utility of assuming office.  Thus the
choice of ideology affects their payoffs only through affecting their chances of
winning the election.  By contrast, the choice of ambiguity level may affect both the
probability of winning the election and the utility of governing.  Thus, the second
strategic choice variable, namely, the level of ambiguity may confront a candidate
with a trade-off: it will often be the case that a higher level of ambiguity (i.e., low
level of commitment) decreases the probability of winning the election, but
increases its desirability.
We assume that voters have single peaked preferences on the policy space.
Before the election voters learn the platforms of both candidates and use this
information to estimate the policy that each candidate will implement in case he
wins the election.  Thus, voters' preferences on policies translate into a decision rule
that is defined on the parameters of the platforms: ideologies and ambiguity.  In
order to make their decision, voters take into account the distance of the candidates'
ideology from their ideal point, and the level of ambiguity chosen, and think of
them as the mean and the variance of a random variable whose realization
represents the policy that will be actually implemented after the election.  We
assume that voters maximize their expected utility and vote sincerely.  In case of
indifference, we assume that voters vote randomly for either candidate.
We show the solution to this game in two different scenarios: in the first
model the choices of ideology and ambiguity levels are discrete, while in the second
one they are continuous.  In both models a subgame perfect equilibrium always6
exists.  Two kinds of equilibria emerge in these models.  In the first equilibrium both
candidates choose the median voter's preferred ideology and choose a minimal
level of ambiguity.  In the second equilibrium the candidates differentiate
themselves ideologically and choose identical, positive levels of ambiguity.  What
determines which equilibrium prevails is the ratio between the utility of assuming
office and the (dis)utility of being less ambiguous.  Not surprisingly, when
candidates value the fact of winning the election and ambiguity is not very
rewarding (relative to winning the election) the first equilibrium prevails, and
when the candidates care less about winning the election per-se and more about
their freedom once they win the election, the second equilibrium prevails.  In
intermediate parameter values both equilibria may coexist simultaneously.
The intuition underlying the first equilibrium is identical to that of the
standard spatial voting model, namely, both candidates compete by choosing what
they believe to be the median voter's preferred ideology in the first stage of the
game, knowing that by doing so they will be constrained to choose a very specific
platform (low ambiguity).  These strategies constitute an equilibrium when
ambiguity is not very rewarding for candidates.  In this case, the main interest of the
candidates is to maximize the probability of winning the election.
The intuition which underlies the second equilibrium is more interesting.
Candidates differentiate themselves ideologically in order to soften the second stage
competition in ambiguity.  In this equilibrium candidates face a trade-off between
the probability of winning the election and their level of utility in case they win the
election (determined by their level of ambiguity).  Each candidate can guarantee a
50% probability of winning the election by adopting his opponent's ideology, but
when ambiguity is valuable, one of the candidates may increase his expected payoff
by sacrificing some probability of winning and allowing himself an ambiguous
platform in case of winning.  That is, at an equilibrium with differentiated
ideologies, one candidate may have a lower probability of winning the election.
However, he realizes that should he move closer to the other candidate's ideological
position, the other candidate would retaliate by choosing to be less ambiguous in the
second stage of the campaign, thereby forcing the first candidate to respond by
lowering his own ambiguity level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the main
assumptions of the model that allows us to illustrate our arguments.  In section 37
we solve the model for the case of finite sets of alternatives.  In section 4 we present
a more general (continuous) model and show that the results extend naturally to
this case as well.  In section 5 we discuss the relationship of this paper to the existing
political and economic literature.  Section 6 concludes.  A detailed formal derivation
of the results is relegated to the appendix.
2.  The main assumptions.
As noted in the introduction, we model the electoral competition between
two candidates as a two stage game and analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this
game.  We now describe the electoral game, starting with the preferences of the
candidates and the voters.
We denote the two candidates by 1 and 2.  Let Á denote the set of ideologies
available to the candidates, and let À denote the set of levels of ambiguity.  In the
first stage of the game, the candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies  I1,I2 ( )
where Ii ÎÁ for i Î 1,2 { }.  In the second stage of the game, the candidates
simultaneously announce their ambiguity level  a1,a2 ( ), or the degree of their
commitment to their ideologies  I1,I2 ( ), which at this stage are publicly known.
Formally, a candidate's (pure) strategy can be described by a vector  I, f ( ).  I ÎÁ
denotes the ideology chosen by the candidate and  f  denotes the candidate's choice
of an ambiguity level as a function of the ideology choices of the first stage.  Since in
the second stage of the electoral game the ideologies of the candidates are publicly
known, the candidates can choose their levels of ambiguity conditional on them.
Formally, the level of ambiguity  f  is a function that maps the ideologies that were
chosen in the first stage into À, or  f:Á´ Á®À.  The strategy of candidate i Î 1,2 { } is
denoted by  Ii, f i ( ).
We assume that the candidates have identical utility functions which are
increasing in the probability of winning the election and with the level of
ambiguity.  Formally, the utility function of candidate i is
Ui I1, f1;I2, f2 ( ) = P I1,a1;I2,a2 ( )u ai ( ) where ai = f i I1,I2 ( ) is candidate i's level of
ambiguity; Pi I1,a1;I2,a2 ( ) denotes the probability that candidate i wins the election
given the candidates' choices of ideologies and levels of ambiguity; and u a ( ) is an
increasing function that represents the utility of winning the election given the
level of ambiguity chosen by the candidate in his platform.8
During the campaign voters learn the platforms presented by the candidates.
Therefore, they learn the candidates' ideologies and their levels of ambiguity.  The
decision rule of the voters is defined on these two variables as a result of the
maximization of their expected utility.  Given two candidates with the same level of
ambiguity, a voter prefers the one whose ideology is closer to her ideal point.  We
also assume that voters dislike ambiguous candidates.  In general, we will assume
that given two candidates with the same ideology, all voters prefer the one with the
lowest level of ambiguity.  We will only relax this assumption in a special case that
gives the same qualitative results, in which the structure of the ideology set calls for
a more natural description of the voters' preferences.
Voters vote sincerely.  That is, they vote for the candidate who is ranked
higher according to their decision rule.  When a voter is indifferent between the two
candidates, she votes randomly for either candidate.
We assume that candidates do not know the distribution of the voters' ideal
points, instead they have a common belief about this distribution.  Alternatively, we
could assume that candidates know the exact distribution of the voters' ideal points,
but voter turnout is random.  If the candidates knew the preferences of the median
voter, the choice of ideologies would be trivial: both candidates would choose the
most preferred ideology by the median voter and the competition of the second
stage would lead both candidates to choose unambiguous platforms.  Thus, it is
essential that candidates are uncertain about the preferences of the median voter in
order to derive more interesting results.
The temporal aspect of the choice of the platforms is also a necessary
condition to have a result other than Downs' median voter.  If the choice of
ideology and ambiguity was simultaneous, candidates would never choose different
ideologies in equilibrium, since approaching the position of the other candidate
would always be a profitable deviation.  The choice of platforms in two stages allows
the candidates to commit, with their choices of ideologies at the beginning of the
campaign, to a softer competition in ambiguity in the second stage.
We now proceed to solve two different specifications of this model.  First we
solve a very simple case, in which the number of ideologies and levels of ambiguity
available to the candidates are minimal, but enough to show the choice in
equilibrium of different ideologies and ambiguous platforms.  Then we analyze a9
general case, with a continuum of ideologies, and a continuum of levels of
ambiguity, that reproduce the same qualitative results.
3. A Discrete Model of Strategic Ambiguity.
In this model, we assume that, in the first stage of the game, a candidate can
choose to be either "Leftist", "Centrist", or "Rightist".  Thus, we have that the set of
ideologies is Á = L,C,R { }.  In the second stage of the game,  the level of ambiguity
can take only two values, a Î al,ah { } where 0 £ al <ah.  al stands for a choice of a low
level of ambiguity, and ah stands for a choice of a high level of ambiguity.
We assume that the utility that candidates derive from being in office is
represented by u a ( ) = k + a, where a is the level of ambiguity of the candidate's
platform, and k  is a positive constant to be interpreted as the utility that the
candidate derives from winning the election per se.  Note that as k  increases, the
significance of ambiguity in the candidate's payoff decreases and the model
"converges" to the usual Downsian model.
The voters in this model are assumed to belong to three main blocs: Leftist,
Centrist, and Rightist.  The preferences of the voters depend only on their
ideological identification, that is, on their blocs.  We present the voters' preferences
on platforms in the following table: (the alternatives are ranked in decreasing order
from top to bottom),
Leftist Centrist Rightist
L,a l ( ) C,al ( ) R,al ( )
L,ah ( ) C,ah ( ) R,ah ( )
C,al ( ) C,ah ( ) L,ah ( ) R,ah ( ) C,al ( ) C,ah ( )
R,ah ( ) L,a l ( ) R,al ( ) L,ah ( )
R,al ( ) L,a l ( )
Voters' preferences are based on the premise that candidates are likely to adopt
policies that agree with their ideology and less ambiguous candidates are even more10
likely to do so.  If an ambiguous candidate implements a policy that is not his stated
ideology, voters assume that centrist candidates are equally likely to drift to either
side of the policy space, while extremist candidates are more likely to drift to the
center.  Thus, the voters' decision rule is lexicographic: when comparing two
candidates, a voter always prefers the one who is ideologically closer to her.  Only if
the ideologies of the candidates are identical, does the voter consider their ambiguity
levels.  The preference for ambiguity depends on the ideology of the voter, and,
specifically, on whether she would like the candidate to "drift" from his stated
ideology.  A leftist voter, for example, has the following preferences: she prefers a
candidate which stands for a leftist ideology to a centrist candidate, and a centrist
candidate is obviously preferred to a rightist candidate.  As for the ambiguity of the
candidates - an unambiguous leftist candidate is the best, a more ambiguous leftist
candidate is not as good, but is still better than anyone else.  The voter is indifferent
between the levels of ambiguity of centrist candidates.  Lastly, an ambiguous rightist
candidate is preferred to an unambiguous one - which is worse yet.  The preferences
of a rightist voter are symmetric: first comes an unambiguous rightist candidate,
then a more ambiguous rightist candidate, and so on.  A centrist voter prefers an
unambiguous centrist candidate the most, then she prefers a more ambiguous
centrist candidate.  She is indifferent between ambiguous or lowly committed leftist
and rightist candidates, and is most averse to unambiguous or highly committed
extreme candidates.  It is important to note that these voters’ preferences can be
justified on grounds of stochastic dominance.  Namely, a leftist voter prefers an
unambiguous or a highly committed leftist candidate to a more ambiguous or less
committed leftist candidate because the probability that the latter will implement a
centrist or rightist policy is higher.  Similarly, an ambiguous leftist candidate is
preferred to a centrist candidate and so on.2
Voters vote sincerely.  That is, they vote for the candidate who is ranked
higher in their preference profile.  When a voter is indifferent between the two
candidates, she votes randomly for either candidate.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the size of the population to be 1.
We denote the size of the "Leftist" bloc by nL, the size of the "Centrist" bloc by nC,
and the size of the "Rightist" bloc by nR.  Each bloc has a non-negative size and
2    Similar results obtain when voters' preferences are such that between two candidates who chose the
same ideology, voters always prefer the candidate with a lower level of ambiguity.  However, we
believe that the preferences above are more natural.11
nL + nC + nR = 1.  Each voter knows the bloc to which she belongs, or alternatively, she
knows her preferences.  This information, however, is unobservable to the
candidates.  The candidates do not know the exact sizes of the voters' blocs, but they
have beliefs about them.  Specifically, we assume that the candidates have an
identical prior distribution defined over nL, nC, and nR.  In general, the beliefs of the
candidates can be described by a probability distribution over the two dimensional
simplex as in figure 1.
Each point in the figure corresponds to a different distribution of bloc's sizes.
The respective sizes of the leftist and rightist blocs are depicted by the axes, and the
size of the centrist bloc corresponds to the distance of the point from the diagonal
line connecting the points (0,1) and (1,0).  Thus, for example, the probability that the
leftist bloc forms a majority corresponds to the integral of the distribution function
over the area denoted by  , the probability that the rightist bloc forms a majority
corresponds to the integral of the distribution function over the area denoted by  ,
and the probability that the number of leftist voters exceeds that of the rightist
voters corresponds to the integral of the distribution function over the area denoted
by  + .
As we demonstrate in the sequel, the exact distribution of the sizes of voters'
blocs is immaterial.  For our results, the information contained in the distribution
can be summarized by the following two probabilities: the probability that the leftist
bloc forms a majority, or P nL > 1
2 ( ); and the probability that the rightist block forms
a majority, or, P nR > 1
2 ( ).  We focus our attention on the case where the median
voter, as perceived by the candidates, belongs to the centrist bloc of voters.  That is,
we assume that 0 £ P nL > 1
2 ( ),P nR > 1
2 ( ) £ 1
2.3
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the candidates choose their ideologies in
the first stage while taking into account the implications of their choices to the
second stage game.  In the second stage, they continue to play their equilibrium
strategies, as foreseen in the first stage of the game.  Our results depend on the
relative significance of ambiguity as expressed by the ratio 
k + al
k + ah
, denoted  .  We
summarize the results in the following theorem.
3 Relaxing this assumption yields "less interesting" equilibria where both candidates choose a leftist or
rightist ideology according to the location of the median voter.12




< 1, in the electoral game described above,
generically, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium whose outcomes are
as follows:
(a) When P nL > 1
2 ( ) < 2   and P nR > 1
2 ( ) < 2 , both candidates choose a
centrist ideology and a low level of ambiguity.
(b) When  2 <P n L >1
2 ( )
 
and P nL> 1
2 ( )>P nR > 1
2 ( ) one candidate chooses
a leftist ideology, the other a centrist ideology, and both choose a high level of
ambiguity.
(c) When  2 <P n R> 1
2 ( ) and P nR > 1
2 ( ) > P nL > 1
2 ( ) one candidate chooses
a rightist ideology, the other a centrist ideology, and both choose a high level of
ambiguity.
(The proof of the theorem is relegated to the appendix.)
Figure 2 depicts the ideologies chosen as equilibrium outcomes.  On the
borders between the different areas of the figure (that is, on the lines), the possible
equilibrium outcomes are those of the bordering areas.
When   is small, the significance of ambiguity in the payoff of the candidates
is very high, and it is not surprising that in equilibrium both candidates would
choose ambiguous platforms4.  This theorem focuses on the more interesting case in
which   is not too small, and it shows that we can only find two kind of equilibria
(up to renaming the candidates).  In one of the equilibrium, the two candidates
choose the same ideology in the first stage of the game, and a low level of ambiguity
in the second stage.  We find this equilibrium when the candidates believe that it is
very unlikely that the median voter belongs to any of the extreme blocs.  Thus, a
candidate that deviates from the Centrist ideology would sacrifice an important part
of his payoff due to the decrease in the probability of winning the election.
4 If  < 1
2  our analysis shows that equilibria where both candidates choose the same ideology and a
high level of ambiguity exist.  We find these equilibria – as well as the assumption that the level of
ambiguity is very important to the candidates (namely,  2 < 1
2) – somewhat less interesting.13
When candidates believe that there is a chance that the median voter belongs
to one of the extreme blocs, it is profitable for one of the candidates to choose the
ideology of this bloc, even if it means sacrificing a little probability of winning,
because he can compensate this loss with the gains derived of an ambiguous
platform.  Therefore, in the second kind of equilibrium, candidates choose different
ideologies and a low high level of ambiguity in the second stage.
Notice that the way in which the candidates measure whether it is likely or
not that the median voter belongs to a certain ideological bloc is relative to the ratio
of the payoffs from ambiguity.  As the value of this ratio increases (either k  is very
high, or the values of ah and al are very similar), the incentives of the candidates to
choose different ideologies disappear.  Thus, the results can be summarized as
follows: when the value of ambiguity is high relative to the value of winning the
election per se, in equilibrium candidates will choose different ideologies and
ambiguous platforms, otherwise, they will choose the same ideology and low levels
of ambiguity.
4.  A Continuous Model of Strategic Ambiguity.
In this section we present a continuous version of the same electoral game.
In the first stage of the game the candidates choose their ideologies Ii ÎÂ.  Notice
that the space of ideologies in this case is the real line.  We denote the ambiguity
level of candidate i by ai ÎÂ+, and it can be any non negative number.  As before, in
the second stage of the game, candidates determine their ambiguity levels
f i I1,I2 ( )ÎÂ+ conditional on their ideology choices of the first stage.  The utility that a
candidate derives from winning the election is represented by u a ( ) =k +a
2.5
A voter with an ideal point v derives a utility uv p ( ) =- p-v ( )
2 when policy p
is implemented.  Voters interpret a candidate’s choice of an ideology I and an
ambiguity level a as inducing a distribution  I,a ( ) over his implemented policy
once in office which is uniform over the interval  I - a,I + a [ ].  Voters vote for the
candidate that maximizes their expected utility.  That is, a voter with an ideal point
v votes for the candidate that maximizes her expected utility





.  In case of indifference, she votes randomly.
5 Notice that unlike in the previous section, candidates’ utilities depend on their level of ambiguity
squared. We make this technical assumption to simplify the analysis.14
Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voters' ideal points.  More
specifically, we assume that the candidates believe that the ideal point of the median
voter is uniformly distributed over the interval  0,1 [ ].
We summarize the results in the following theorem.




< k, I1 = I2 = 1
2, and a1 = a 2 = 0 is the unique (up to renaming
the names of the parties) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
• when 0 £ k < 4
3, I1 = - 1
4, I2 = 5
4, and a1 = a2 = 9
2 - k is the unique





, the two previous equilibrium outcomes are the only
subgame perfect equilibria outcomes.
(The proof of the theorem is relegated to the appendix.)
As in the previous case, the results depend on the importance of the level of
ambiguity to the candidates.  In this model the value of ambiguity for the candidates
can be measured by the size of k.  When ambiguity does not play a major role in the
candidates preferences, that is when k is large, both candidates choose the median
voter's ideology in the first stage of the game and strongly commit to it.  When, on
the other hand, the candidates value the flexibility in choosing their subsequent
policy more, that is when k is small, the candidates choose different ideological
positions in the first stage of the game in order to relax the ambiguity competition in
the second stage.
Thus, the results of this model replicate the ones found in the discrete one.
Notice that, unlike in the discrete case where the subgame perfect equilibrium was
unique, in the continuous case, the two kinds of equilibria coexist for a certain range
of the values of k.15
5.  Related Literature
5.1 Political Science Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, the notion of strategic ambiguity has been
extensively dealt with in political science literature.  (For a survey of this literature,
see Shepsle (1972)) This literature has lead to several attempts of formal modelling
of strategic ambiguity.  Generally, these formal models have employed the
assumptions of the standard spatial model.  Ambiguous strategies were represented
as probability distributions (lotteries) over the policy space.  Zeckhauser (1969) is
probably the earliest formal discussion of ambiguous policy formation.  He shows
that under certain conditions, a lottery over some subset of the alternatives can
defeat the median position, and that a component of this lottery can defeat the
lottery itself.  Thus, an alternative that wins a majority of the vote may not exist.
However, he shows that if an equilibrium of the m -dimensional election game
exists, it must be in unambiguous strategies.  Shepsle (1972) shows that if only
uniform lotteries are permitted and the incumbent is restricted to select a less
ambiguous lottery than the challenger, there exist voter preferences such that the
challenger's choice will command more votes than any policy available to the
incumbent.  Mckelvey (1980) studies the effect of the introduction of a fixed amount
of ambiguity (or variance).  He shows that it has no effect on the location or
existence of equilibria in unidimensional models.  For higher dimensions,
assuming that voters' utility functions are multivariate normal density functions,
the introduction of ambiguity does not disrupt equilibria when they exist.
In contrast to the results of this paper, most of the former literature on
strategic ambiguity did not differ qualitatively from the standard spatial model
literature.  Ambiguous policies where chosen by candidates only in special cases of
models with asymmetric assumptions on the behavior of candidates.  One exception
is found in Alesina and Cukierman (1990).  In their model candidates have ideal
points in the policy space, and the incumbent faces the trade-off between
implementing his ideal point and implementing the policy that maximizes his
chances of reelection.  In their model, voters are not perfectly informed about the
preferences of the candidates, and the level of ambiguity is defined as the variance of
the noise between the policy outcome observed by the voters and the policy16
instrument chosen by the candidates.  Thus, as in our case, ambiguity allows
candidates to exploit this trade-off.
5.2 Related Economic Literature
The model presented here is reminiscent of a variation of Hotelling's (1929)
model, due to D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979).  In Hotelling's model,
two sellers choose locations on a line of finite length, to be thought of as "main-
street", and then compete in prices.  Consumers are evenly distributed along the
line and each one of them consumes exactly one unit of the product, irrespective of
its price.  Each consumer buys from the seller who quotes the least delivered price,
that is, the mill price plus the transportation costs which where assumed to be linear
with respect to the distance between the consumer and the seller.  In this model,
Hotelling derived the Principle of Minimal Differentiation: both sellers will tend to
position themselves at the center of the market.
D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse considered a slightly modified version
of Hotelling's model where consumers have quadratic transportation costs as a
function of the distance.  They show that, in the first stage of the game, the sellers
locate as far from one another as possible - the first seller locates at the leftmost end
of the line segment, and the second seller locates at the rightmost end of the line
segment.  The intuition behind this result is that the sellers can soften the price
competition of the second stage by locating far away from each other in the first stage
of the game.  The sellers do not have an incentive to move closer to the median
consumer because if they do so the other seller will retaliate in the second stage by
cutting his prices and escalating the price war.  Locating as far as possible from the
other seller allows the sellers to charge higher prices without losing their
consumers.
The intuition of the two-stage competition in our model is similar to theirs.
Voters dislike ambiguous candidates, in the same fashion than consumers, in
Hotelling's model, dislike high prices.  While candidates like ambiguity, as sellers
benefit from high prices.  The main difference between the two models is that in our
case candidates are concerned with the probability of winning the election, rather
than the maximization of their share of the vote (the share of the market in
Hotelling's model).  This discontinuity of the candidates' utility (with respect to the
share of the voters at  1
2 ) makes our model and results rather different.  In17
particular the principle of maximal differentiation does not hold in our model.  But
the intuition behind the equilibrium in which candidates choose different
ideologies and ambiguous platforms is what drives Hotelling result: candidates
differentiate in the first stage of the game in order to soften the competition in the
second stage.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper we try to find a reason why political candidates often express
electoral promises in vague and ambiguous terms.  One of the results of this
analysis offers an answer to why political candidates with the same electoral
objectives end up making different electoral promises.  These two questions
represent important puzzles in the political science and, as such, have been widely
discussed.  Nevertheless, we think that the answer that we offer is very innovative,
with respect to the existing literature.
The first important feature is the link we present between these two puzzles.
Offering candidates the opportunity to present ambiguous platforms, gives them
incentives to choose different ideologies.  As a result we obtain an explanation of
why Downs' result does not necessarily hold.
The existing literature offers three possible explanations to policy and
ideological differentiation.  Probabilistic voting (see e.g., Hinich, 1977), parties with
different policy preferences (see e.g., Wittman, 1983), and sequential entry (Palfrey,
1984).  By contrast, our model suggests that the strategic role of ambiguity can
account for this phenomena.
Incorporating the choice of the level of ambiguity adds a new strategic
dimension to the standard model of electoral competition.  The candidates may
have an incentive to differentiate themselves in the ideology space so that they can
soften the competition in the ambiguity space.  Hence, this model generalizes the
result of Downs (1957) by showing that the median voter result, where both
candidates choose the same ideological position, holds only as a special case.  Yet, the
spirit of the median voter result is retained.  From the voters' perspective,
ambiguity (or low commitment) blurs the ideological differences between the
candidates.  Less committed candidates that have chosen different ideologies during
the campaign might end up choosing similar policies in case they win the election18
because by choosing ambiguous platforms, the policies available to both candidates
may coincide.
Generally, a candidate can choose to become very explicit with respect to
certain issues, and extremely ambiguous or vague with respect to other issues.  For
clarity of exposition, we introduce a simple model with only one ideology
dimension into the formal models and assume that a candidate simply has to
choose whether he is ambiguous or not.  Thus, these models make the simplest
assumptions possible while still capturing the fact that the candidates are free to
decide how much information they release regarding their future policies.
Finally, we emphasize that any model that shares the underlying features of
our models, namely, a two-stage game where the candidates and voters have
opposed preferences regarding the outcome of the second stage of the game, and
uncertainty about the median voter's preferences, will yield similar results:
candidates may choose to differentiate themselves in the first stage of the game in
order to relax the competition in the second stage of the game.  The interpretation of
the formal model presented here, of strategic ambiguity, is not the only possible one.
For example, another interpretation might be the strategic choice of the level of
corruption.  As in our model, both candidates can be thought of as sharing a
common interest for higher personal corruption that may impair their chances of
winning the election.  Thus, when the benefit from corruption is sufficiently high,
the candidates will differentiate themselves ideologically in the first stage of the
game so that they will be able to relax the competition in the second stage of the
game and be more corrupt.  (Myerson (1993) offers related analysis.)19
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Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 We start by computing the equilibria of the second
stage games.  Symmetry considerations imply that in order to analyze the second
stage game, we need to study only four different classes of second stage games:
(1) Where both candidates have chosen a centrist ideology in the first
stage, or  G(C,C).
(2) Where both candidates have chosen an identical ideological position in
the first  stage, but not the centrist one, G(L,L) or G(R,R).
(3) Where the candidates have chosen adjacent ideological positions in the
first stage,  G(L,C), G(C,L), G(C,R), or G(R,C).
(4) Where the candidates have chosen extreme ideological positions in the
first stage  of the game, G(L,R) or G(R,L).
First, consider the game G(C,C).  Notice that since leftist and rightist voters are
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2, al,al ( ) is the only
equilibrium of the game G(C,C).
In the game G(L,C) leftist voters vote for the leftist party and centrist and
rightist voters vote for the centrist party.21
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Strict dominance considerations imply that  ah,ah ( ) is the unique equilibrium
of this game as well as of the games G(C,L), G(C,R) and G(R,C).  In the game G(L,L)
the less ambiguous candidate gets the vote of the leftist bloc and the more
ambiguous candidate gets the vote of the centrist and rightist voters.  Therefore,
again, strict dominance considerations imply that  ah,ah ( ) is the unique equilibrium.
Similarly,  ah,ah ( ) is the unique equilibrium of the game G(R,R) as well.
In the game G(L,R) leftist voters vote for the leftist candidate, rightist voters
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It is straightforward to verify that  ah,ah ( ) is the only equilibrium of G(L,R).
Analogously, it is also the only equilibrium of G(R,L).
LEMMA In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the candidates do not choose
L,R ( ), R,L ( ), L,L ( ), or  R,R ( ) in the first stage of the game.
Proof We show that the candidates do not choose  L,R ( ) in the first stage of
the game.  Since  ah,ah ( ) is the unique equilibrium played after the candidates choose
(L,C) in the first stage of the game, by deviating and choosing C, the second candidate
gets the vote of the centrist voters and so increases his probability of winning the
elections from P nR > nL ( )= 1- P nL > nR ( ) to 1- P nL > 1
2 ( ) without changing his level
of ambiguity.  A similar argument shows that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the
candidates do not choose  R,L ( ) either.  In much the same way, candidates do not
choose  L,L ( ) or  R,R ( ) in a subgame perfect equilibrium.  In a subgame perfect
equilibrium, the fact that 0 £ P nL > 1
2 ( ),P nR > 1
2 ( ) £ 1
2 implies that by deviating to
the center a candidate increases his probability of winning without decreasing his
level of ambiguity.  
Thus, up to renaming the candidates, only (C,C), (L,C) and (C,R) can be chosen
in the first stage of the electoral game in a subgame perfect equilibrium.  To
complete the proof of the theorem notice that when  2 > max P nL > 1
2 ( ),P nR > 1
2 ( ) { },
C,al;C,al ( ), is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the electoral game, when
P nL > 1
2 ( ) > 2  and  P nL > 1
2 ( ) > P nR > 1
2 ( ),  L,ah;C,ah ( ) is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the electoral game, and when  nR > 1
2 ( ) > 2  and
P nL > 1
2 ( ) < P nR > 1
2 ( ),  C,ah;R,ah ( ) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
electoral game.  In case of equalities, all the equilibria of the neighboring regions are
possible.  
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 As in the proof of theorem 1, we compute the
subgame perfect equilibria through backward induction.  First, we compute the
equilibrium levels of ambiguity as a function of the ideology choices of the first stage
of the electoral game and then we compute the equilibrium's ideologies.  In a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), if the candidates choose the same ideologies in
the first stage of the game, all voters vote for the candidate that chooses a lower
level of ambiguity in the second.  Therefore, the only second stage SPE involves23
both candidates choosing zero ambiguity.  Suppose then that I1 < I2 .  For i Î 1,2 { },
denote  i =ai
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The probabilities with which the candidates win the election are,
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Therefore, the candidates' respective utilities are,
U1 I1,a1;I2,a2 ( ) =
0
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Notice that the utilities are either linear or quadratic in  .  Thus, in the second stage
of the game, when I1,I2 and  2  are fixed, the optimal  1 is,
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When I 1,I2 and  1  are fixed, the optimal  2  is,
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We represent the  i *'s as reaction functions.  We distinguish between two cases (1)
where k ³6 I2 - I1 ( ), and (2) where k £6 I2 - I1 ( ).  When k ³6 I2 - I1 ( ),
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and when k £6 I2 - I1 ( ),24
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We continue by incorporating the second stage equilibrium levels of
ambiguity into the candidates' utilities, and compute the candidates' utilities as
functions of the ideologies alone.  Notice that the  i *'s are continuous in I1 and I2
and therefore the candidates' utilities are continuous in I1 and  I2.
We start by analyzing the simpler case, where k ³ 6 I2 - I1 ( ).  We distinguish
three subcases.  (i) Suppose that 0 < I2 + I1 < 2.  This implies that 0 < v*< 1, and
therefore  1*= 2* = 0, U1 =
I2 + I1
2






ø k .  (ii) Suppose that
I2 + I1 £ 0.  It follows that v*= 0,  1*= 0 and  2* =-3 I 2
2 -I 1
2 ( ).  Consequently U1 = 0
and U2 = k - 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ).  Lastly, in case that (iii)  2 £ I2 + I1.  It follows that v*= 1,
1*= 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ) - 6 I2 - I1 ( )  and  2* = 0.  Thus, U1 = k + 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ) - 6 I2 - I1 ( ) and U2 = 0.
In all the above cases, at least one of the candidates can always benefit by locating
closer to the other candidate in the first stage of the game.  Therefore, we conclude
that no equilibrium exists in this range of ideology choices.
We now analyze the more complicated case where k £ 6 I2 - I1 ( ).  We distinguish six
cases.  The six cases correspond to the six possibilities of matching the slopes of  1*
and  2* which are 0,  1
2  ,or 1.  (Three of the nine possibilities of matching the slopes
are impossible.)  We number these cases (1.1), (1.2), (2.1), (1.3), (3.1), and (2.2).  ((1.3),
for example, represents the region where  1* has slope 0 and  2* slope 1.)  We
represent the regions that correspond to these cases in figure 3.  As we show in the
sequel, candidates' utilities in regions (i), (ii) and (iii) coincide with those of regions
(1.1), (1.3) and (3.1) respectively.
We now show that except for region (2.2), all regions of ideology choices do
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ø k .  Since both candidates can increase their utility by moving closer
to the other candidate in the first stage of the game, no equilibrium exists for this
range of ideology choices.
(1.3) When  3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( )+ 6 I2 - I1 ( ) - k £ 0 { },  1*= 0 and  2* =-3 I 2
2 -I 1
2 ( ).  It follows
that v*= 0.  Therefore, in this region U1 = 0 and U2 = k - 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ).  Since candidate 1
can guarantee himself a positive utility by choosing candidate's 2 ideology in the
first stage of the game, no equilibrium exists for this range of ideology choices.
(3.1) When  -3 I2
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2 ( ) - 6 I2 - I1 ( ) and  2* = 0.  It
follows that v*= 1.  Therefore, in this region U1 = 3 I2
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2 ( )- 6 I2 - I1 ( )+ k  and U2 = 0.
Since candidate 2 can guarantee himself a positive utility by choosing candidate's 1
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Notice that 0 £ v*Û I2 +I1 ³-2 and that v*£1Û I2 + I1 £ 4 and that both inequalities









ø 2 I2 - I1 ( )+ I2
2 - I1










ø 4 I2 - I1 ( )- I2
2 - I1
2 ( ) ( ).  The only possible equilibrium in this region is
I1* = -1
4, I2* = 5
4, and  1*= 2* = 9
2 - k  when k £9
2.
(2.1) When 
k - 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ) £ 0 £12 I2 - I1 ( )- 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( )- k
0 £ I2
2 - I1












2 ( )- k ( ) and





12 I2 - I1 ( )
.  We claim that 0 £ v*£ 1.  Notice that
v*³ 0 Û 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( )+ k ³ 0 and v*£1Û 12 I2 - I1 ( )- 3 I2
2 - I1






12 I2 - I1 ( )
æ 
è 











12 I2 - I1 ( )
æ 
è 
ç  ö 
ø 
÷ k.  We









12 I2 - I1 ( )
2  and therefore 2's best response to 1 is to set I2 = I1 +
k
3
whenever it is possible in this region and to set I2 on the boundaries of the region
when it is not possible.  Since the utilities of the candidates are continuous in the
ideologies, the analysis of the other regions shows that there can be no equilibrium
on the boundaries of 2.1.  Specifically, 2.1 borders with regions 1.1, 3.1, and 2.2.  We
already proved that no equilibrium exists in regions 1.1 and 3.1 including their
boundaries and the only equilibrium that may exist in region 2.2 does not lie on its
boundary with region 2.1.  We now show that there can be no interior equilibrium
in 2.1 either.  In any interior equilibrium, 2 sets I2 = I1 +
k
3
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Symmetry arguments (to region 2.1) imply that no equilibrium exists in this range of
ideology choices.27
Thus, we have identified two candidate equilibria
(i) I1* = I2*= 1
2 and  1*= 2* = 0.  And,
(ii) I 1*= -1
4, I2*= 5
4, and  1*= 2* = 9
2 - k .
We claim that (i) holds as SPE for any k ³ 4
3 and that (ii) holds as SPE for any
k £ 33
16.  To verify the first claim notice that when I1* = I2*= 1
2 and  1*= 2* = 0
the candidates will benefit mostly from deviating into region 2.2.  Symmetry
considerations imply that it is sufficient to check the equilibrium against a deviation
of one candidate only.  Candidate 1 will benefit mostly by deviating into region 2.2
and choosing I1 = -1
2 which will give him a utility of 2
3, hence the bound k ³ 4
3.
(It is straightforward to verify that 1 will not deviate into region 1.1 where he would
rather locate as close as possible to candidate 2, to region 1.3 where he gets a utility of
0, nor to region 1.2 where his maximal utility is  1
2 - k
12 ( )k £ k
2.  Similarly, 2 will
not deviate to regions 1.1, 3.1 and 2.1, and therefore by applying symmetry again we
conclude that 1 will not deviate and choose I1 > I2 either.) To verify the second claim
notice that when I1* = -1
4, I2* = 5
4, and  1*= 2* = 9
2 - k , candidate 1 will benefit
mostly by deviating into region 3.1 where his utility is U1 = k + 3 I2
2 - I1
2 ( ) - 6 I2 - I1 ( ).
Analogously, candidate 2 will benefit mostly by deviating into region 1.3 where his
utility is U2 = k -3 I2
2 -I1
2 ( ).  As before, it is sufficient to verify that the equilibrium is
immuned against a deviation of one candidate.  The highest utility that candidate 1
can achieve in region 3.1 is obtained when I1 = 1 and equals k + 3
16 while at
equilibrium 1's utility equals 9
4. Hence the bound k £33
16.  (It is straightforward to
verify that 1 will not deviate into region 1.2 where he is forced to choose a zero level
of ambiguity, nor to region 1.3 where he gets a utility of 0.  Similarly, it is easy to see
that 1 will not deviate and choose I1 > I2 .  It is more difficult to see that deviating
into region 3.1 is preferable to deviating into region 2.1, but intuitively, 1 is better off
in 3.1 than in 2.1.)  This completes the proof of the theorem.  